Reformed epistemology and Presuppositional apologetics

One problem about presuppositional apologetics which I hinted at in my last post is that when it speaks of circular reasoning being inevitable it seems to assuming that everything we believe we claim certainty about. More specifically presuppositionalists appear to be using the classic trilemma of skepticism; all propositions ultimately end up in circular reasoning, an infinite regress or brute facts. For one thing this trilemma seems self-defeating in the sense that we could never be certain that its correct if it is indeed correct. But more important to this discussion, the trilemma would only apply to claims to certainty if correct. Enter properly basic beliefs. Properly basic beliefs are such that you don’t have to justify them in order to be justified in believing them. One way this can be the case is if the truth of a belief is apparent to you in a significant way and that belief has no defeaters or reasons for doubting its true. For example, the external world, we experience it every day and have no reason for thinking its not there beyond the possibility that its not. So one could say that even though we aren’t certain, we are justified in believing the external world exists.

Reformed epistemology argues that this is the case with God. God is something many people experience and have no reason for doubting. So for them at least, their belief in God is justified. This is a weaker claim than the presuppositionalist’s, but it is similar in some ways. Reformed epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga agree with the presuppositionalist that arguments for God’s existence are not needed and that a defensive apologetic is really all that is necessary for Christianity to be rational.

One thing I like about reformed epistemology is that it allows those who don’t have the education to learn about arguments for and against God’s existence to still be rational in their belief of God. Some potential problems include the infamous Great Pumpkin objection. What beliefs couldn’t be considered properly basic under reformed epistemology?

For more information about this view, including a response to some objections see;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reformed_epistemology
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/without_evidence_or_argument.pdf