The Reformed position has traditionally been that man is totally depraved not so that he isn’t free but that he never desires to do anything good. Calvinist’s see freedom then as what the ability of man to do what he desires. This sees freedom as only nullified in a causal chain if one is prevented from doing what one desires.
Calvinists and Reformed thinkers will often use the following thought experiment to defend their version of compatibilism;
Suppose that the substance peanut butter is the worst tasting edible food in existence. Now suppose that a person sat down in a room and given a choice between eating peanut butter or eating the most delicious steak ever made. Would he or she choose the peanut butter or the steak? It seems safe to assume such a person would choose the steak over the peanut butter. Furthermore, this experiment could be repeated many times over and we would get the same result every time.
Strictly speaking, its difficult to deny that this reflects a situation in which the person is completely free in his decision. On the other hand, it is also difficult to see how this is an adequate analogy to what the Calvinist is proposing, for it ignores the essential moral element in the situation. It must also be supposed that eating peanut butter is a moral obligation given to us by God whereas eating the steak is the sinful choice. It must also be supposed, according to the Calvinist, that our distaste for peanut butter is a result of inheriting Adam’s sinfulness or fallen nature. Finally, we must assume that there is no possible circumstance where the natural man would choose to eat peanut butter over the steak, even if his life depended on it (peanut butter must taste that bad).
Given these three clarifications its difficult to see how this is in anyway a description of genuine free will, or the ability to make moral decisions. For genuine free will to exist there must be a circumstance where the person would choose to eat the peanut butter over the steak. If this is not the case, whatever free will we do have is of no consequence. In other words, it would be no different if we had no free will. But if this is the case in what meaningful way does the Calvinist system allow us to have free will? In addition to this, genuine free will requires that our will not be determine by antecedent factors such that our moral desires are totally fixed. If I were given chemical injections as a child, for instance, which made me perpetually happy about working in a factory as a slave that obviously wouldn’t be genuine happiness. Similarly, if Adam’s sin caused man’s nature to fall so far that our wills are destined to despise God no matter what we do, its again difficult if not impossible to see how we have free will regardless of whether or not God permits or directly causes our behavior.
In response to this, the Calvinist may respond that even though we don’t have genuine free will it is nevertheless our desires which caused our sins and thus God is still just for punishing us for our sins. Well not really, not if our desires are forced upon us such that there is no way we could freely respond differently to God. I still see no way out of this problem for the Calvinist except to bite the bullet and say justice and all other moral concepts are not only grounded in God but defined by the will of God. I think this is a view that we ought to reject especially since it is not required by the Biblical text.
Of course the usual go to verse for a refutation of my prior statement is Romans 3:11-12 which states “No one understands, no one seeks for God. All have turned aside; together they have become worthless; no one does good, not even one.” This is a poor proof text for the Calvinist position that man could never, under any circumstance, choose to do good or to respond in faith towards Christ. All this passage is pointing out is that the natural man does not actively seek out God nor have any desire to do so. It doesn’t say that if God pursues them and “knocks on their door” so to speak that they wouldn’t be able to change their mind. To go back to the peanut butter analogy, this passage doesn’t require you to believe that if a doctor told the person making that decision if they don’t eat the peanut butter they will die in the next 30 seconds still wouldn’t eat the peanut butter.
But even if we suppose that natural man can’t even respond to God in faith then it certainly seems possible that God could give that person a sort of prevenient grace such that they could make a genuinely free decision.
As of yet I have not heard a compelling response to these objections but I hope to hear it if it is out there. Until then I pray Calvinists will head this message and correct their theology accordingly.
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